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“When you say I don’t care about the right to privacy because I have nothing to 
hide, that is no different than saying I don’t care about freedom of speech 
because I have nothing to say or freedom of the press because I have nothing to 
write.”1 
― Edward Snowden 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, the FBI reported that on average more than 4,000 
ransomware attacks occurred every day.2 An October 2017 Equifax breach 
exposed the sensitive personal information of nearly 146 million 
Americans3—almost half of the United States population.4 To make matters 
worse, after the Equifax breach, the public was directed to a phishing 
 1 Alan Rusbridger et al., Edward Snowden: NSA Reform in the US is Only the Beginning, 
GUARDIAN (May 22, 2015, 12:46 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/may/22/edward-
snowden-nsa-reform [https://perma.cc/278K-22CA]; Guido, Edward Snowden about Privacy, 
YOUTUBE (Aug. 16, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpO3GeXTceM [https://perma.cc/
Y5QQ-2QB4]. 
 2 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOW TO PROTECT YOUR NETWORKS FROM RANSOMWARE: INTERAGENCY
TECHNICAL GUIDANCE DOCUMENT 2 (June 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/872771/
download [https://perma.cc/6GAZ-F442]. 
 3 Ron Lieber, How to Protect Yourself After the Equifax Breach, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/your-money/equifax-data-breach-credit.html 
[https://perma.cc/5YZV-NDKQ]. 
 4 U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2019). 
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website to “check” if personal information was stolen.5 The internet is the 
new Wild West for any tech-savvy individual, and, in this modern age, 
there is no telling how far the tech-horizon reaches. 
State data breach notification laws are not uniform.6 There also is no 
uniform federal statute governing data breach notification.7 However, a 
state-by-state method, as will be analyzed in this note, is the best method 
for providing notice to consumers. 
After a company is hacked, resulting in a data breach incident, the 
company is often placed in a tough situation and must determine whether to 
provide notice, how to provide notice, and how to best mitigate liability. 
These issues, in turn, have a ripple effect on consumers. After a serious 
breach, consumers are often left with a myriad of questions and concerns. 
Indeed, even consumers who sue the breached company in class-action 
lawsuits soon discover that they cannot establish standing.
The legal issues that technology has opened in this area are staggering 
and uncertain. With daily hackings, companies stand to lose millions of 
dollars, intellectual property, as well as brand trust. Concurrently, 
customers stand to have identities and personal information stolen without 
legal recourse. The innocence of the internet has faded in this naked age 
where nothing is secure, nothing is protected, and nothing can be covered 
up. 
This is a walk-through note that is organized into four sections. The 
first section is an explanation and background on various hacking methods. 
The second section is an overview of Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA.8 The 
third section examines Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC.9 Finally, 
the fourth section is a two-part analysis that discusses the following: (1) 
how Clapper and Remijas work in harmony for determining consumer 
standing after a breach, and (2) the benefits that state data breach 
notification laws provide, as opposed to a uniform federal notification 
standard. 
 5 Merrit Kennedy, After Massive Data Breach, Equifax Directed Customers to Fake Site, NPR
(Sept. 21, 2017, 5:13 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/21/552681357/after-
massive-data-breach-equifax-directed-customers-to-fake-site [https://perma.cc/D92S-63QK]. 
 6 See LIISA M. THOMAS, THOMAS ON DATA BREACH: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HANDLING DATA 
BREACH NOTIFICATIONS WORLDWIDE 3 (2017); see also Jeff Kosseff, Positive Cybersecurity Law: 
Creating a Consistent and Incentive-Based System, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 401, 402 (2016). 
 7 See Kathryn E. Picanso, Protecting Information Security Under a Uniform Data Breach 
Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 389–90 (2006). 
8 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
9 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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I. HOW DO HACKERS HACK? 
The ways in which hackers hack into a company, database, or system 
are creative, secretive, and important to understand. This note will next 
discuss several of the common ways that hackers hack.10 
First, “spear fishing,” or email social engineering, is a very common 
tactic utilized by hackers.11 Under this method, hackers send an email or an 
instant message directly to a target at a company.12 Once the message is 
opened, malware is released and it then seeks any vulnerabilities in the 
system.13 Once the malware is in the system a communication channel will 
open between the hacker and the system, allowing the hacker to control and 
browse the system.14 Finally, once inside the system, the hacker can use the 
infected computer as a “beachhead” allowing access to other machines 
within the network.15 
Infection via a “drive-by” web download is where a hacker implants a 
piece of code that infects any user who goes onto the website.16 When the 
web-surfer visits, or “drives-by” the web-page, the malicious code gains 
access to the web-surfer’s computer and begins to download in the 
background of the web-surfer’s computer—unbeknownst to the web-
 
 10 Michelle Fox, 10 Ways Companies Get Hacked, CNBC (July 6, 2012, 12:22 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2012/07/06/10-Ways-Companies-Get-Hacked.html [https://perma.cc/97Q9-
39TL483D-9W6G]. Hackers hack in a few of the following ways: “spear fishing”; infection via a 
“drive-by” web download; USB key malware; scanning networks for vulnerabilities and exploitation; 
guessing or social engineering passwords; Wi-Fi compromises; stealing credentials from third-party 
sites; compromising web-based databases; exploiting password reset services to hijack accounts; and 
through insider infiltration. Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id.; see also Margaret Rouse, Malware (Malicious Software), TECHTARGET, 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/malware [https://perma.cc/WLV5-T2SX] (“Malware, or 
malicious software, is any program or file that is harmful to a computer user. Malware includes 
computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses and spyware. These malicious programs can perform a variety 
of functions, including stealing, encrypting or deleting sensitive data, altering or hijacking core 
computing functions and monitoring users’ computer activity without their permission.”). 
 14 Fox, supra note 10. This is why it is very important to be careful and cognizant of what you are 
clicking and opening while on the internet. 
 15 Id.; see also April Glaser, A Massive Google Docs Hack Is Spreading Like Wildfire, RECODE 
(May 3, 2017, 4:23 PM), https://www.recode.net/2017/5/3/15535018/google-docs-hack-spreading-
email-phishing [https://perma.cc/GJ2Z-PD8X] (“When you click on the link to open the file, you are 
directed to grant access to an app that looks like Google Docs but is actually a program that sends spam 
emails to everyone you’ve emailed. . . . The practice of sending an email in order to trick someone into 
granting access to their personal information is called phishing, and it’s usually done for malicious 
reasons, like to steal credit card information or trick them into sharing their password.”). 
 16 Fox, supra note 10, at 3; What is a “Drive-By” Download? MCAFEE (Apr. 2, 2013), https://
securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/drive-by-download/ [https://perma.cc/33SW-
CMBV ] (this type of access can also occur through other types of devices, not strictly computers). 
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surfer.17 Thus, the website appears innocent while the malicious code is 
being installed on the web-surfer’s device. 
 Hackers scan networks for vulnerabilities using a point-of-entry 
exploitation method.18 Under this method, hackers send commands to a 
server, attempt to crash the server, and then attempt to install malicious 
code on the crashed system.19 
Hackers also guess or socially engineer passwords.20 According to one 
survey, the three most common passwords in the world are “123456,” 
“123456789,” and “qwerty.”21 Socially engineering passwords is similar to 
“Facebook stalking.”22 Hackers research their target’s various social media 
accounts to determine answers to password reset questions—which in turn 
can provide access to login information.23 Hackers also directly contact 
 
 17 Fox, supra note 10, at 5. 
 18 Id. This point-of-entry exploitation method is particularly prevalent among smaller companies 
with weaker security systems. 
 19 Id. There are even step-by-step tutorials to teach hackers how to conduct point-of-entry 
exploitations. See OCCUPYTHEWEB, Hack Like A Pro: How to Scan for Vulnerabilities with Nessus, 
WONDER HOW TO (Apr. 5, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/how-to/hack-like-pro-
scan-for-vulnerabilities-with-nessus-0169971/ [https://perma.cc/72T3-XPF2]. 
 20 Fox, supra note 10, at 6. 
 21 Shivali Best, Will We Ever Learn? 123456 Is STILL the World’s Most Popular Password: Here 
Are the Top 25 Phrases to Avoid, DAILYMAIL (Jan. 16, 2017), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4125128/The-common-passwords-used-2016.html#ixzz
4yo3lblhZ [https://perma.cc/52WB-YC29]. Granted, this type of survey and result can easily be 
undermined because these “three most popular” may simply be the product of a minority of internet 
users. For instance, if all the world’s population has wildly different and complicated passwords, but 
four people have “123456” as their password, three people have “123456789,” and three people use 
“qwerty,” now these three are the “world’s most popular passwords.” Cynicism aside, a study like this 
does go to show that most people have easy-to-guess-passwords that are overused and that do not 
provide enough protection from hackers. 
 22 Facebook Stalking, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/27873/facebook-
stalking [https://perma.cc/A3S9-STRE]. 
 23 Fox, supra note 10. This is where a hacker can use Facebook to determine basic information 
about their target that is often asked in security questions. See also Lily Hay Newman, Time to Kill 
Security Questions—Or Answer Them With Lies, WIRED (Sep. 28, 2016, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/09/time-kill-security-questions-answer-lies/ [https://perma.cc/NXS3-
9BE8 ] (“The best way to make security answers more robust is to lie in your answers, and ideally use a 
random string of characters as the answer instead of submitting any meaningful information. That way, 
even if a question addresses an obscure life detail that you’re confident a hacker couldn’t find out about 
you, you’re still not revealing answers that could be compromised in a breach.”); Brandon Specktor, 
Your Password Recovery Questions are Insanely Easy to Hack—and You Might Be to Blame, 
READER’S DIGEST, https://www.rd.com/advice/work-career/password-recovery-questions/ [https://
perma.cc/99EW-D524] (a hacker allegedly breached Mitt Romney’s personal email by determining the 
name of Mitt’s dog’s name, which turned out to be the answer to Mitt’s password reminder and reset). 
For instance, if a password reset security question is “What was the name of the street you grew up 
on?” or “What is your freshman year college roommate’s name?” Google Maps and Facebook can 
likely provide the answer to a determined hacker. Thus, your childhood street name should probably be 
something like, “S7v]^be”, and your college roommate’s name should be, “jIf73)|(3,Nckidow093Jf0”. 
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employees asking to reset their password, which provides the hacker the 
employee’s password.24 
Wi-Fi is another avenue for hackers to invade a system.25 For instance, 
hackers can position themselves near or even inside a business’s physical 
location—close enough to be in range of the Wi-Fi—and then engage in a 
series of different methods to find an unsecured or poorly secured system 
to steal information from.26 
Hackers further obtain personal credentials by going through third-
party websites, a method known as “collateral hacking.”27 For example, a 
hacker may go onto a website such as LinkedIn, find a target who works 
for a desired company, and proceed to hack the third-party website to steal 
the target’s username and password.28 People often use the same login 
information or slight variations of it for multiple websites.29 Thus, if the 
hacker obtains the login information for one website, there is a high 
probability that they will be able to use that login information for other 
websites.30 
 
 24 Fox, supra note 10, at 10; see also Sam Shead, Hackers are Offering Apple Employees in Ireland 
up to €20,000 for Their Login Details, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 9, 2016, 6:49 AM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/hackers-offering-apple-employees-in-ireland-euros-login-details-2016-2 
[https://perma.cc/YH7D-KUU9]. 
 25 Fox, supra note 10, at 7. 
 26 Philip Bates, 5 Ways Hackers Can Use Public Wi-Fi to Steal Your Identity, MAKEUSEOF (Oct. 
23, 2016), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/5-ways-hackers-can-use-public-wi-fi-steal-identity/ [https://
perma.cc/XZ5J-7T7K] (five ways hackers can use public Wi-Fi to steal information about you: (1) 
“Man-in-the-Middle Attacks,” (2) Fake Wi-Fi Connections, (3) “Packet Sniffing” (4) “Sidejacking” 
(Session Hacking), and (5) “Shoulder-Surfing”). 
 27 Vangie Beal, collateral hacking, WEBOPEDIA, https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/collateral_
hacking.html [https://perma.cc/HFW6-ULW9] (“Collateral hacking refers to when a company’s critical 
data is compromised as a result of a third party in possession of the company’s sensitive data being 
hacked. Rather than directly hacking into a company, collateral hackers go through a third party in 
order to get to the company’s sensitive data. Collateral hacking frequently results in additional 
companies having their data compromised, as the third-party firm will often have the data of numerous 
companies stored on the hacked server or resource. The security concern of collateral hacking has 
become more prevalent with the increasing popularity of companies storing sensitive data via server 
virtualization, in the cloud or with other third-party storage hosting services.”). 
 28 Fox, supra note 10, at 8. 
 29 Graham Cluley, 55% of Net Users Use the Same Password for Most, if Not All, Websites. When 
Will They Learn? NAKED SECURITY: SOPHOS (Apr. 23, 2013), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/
2013/04/23/users-same-password-most-websites/ [https://perma.cc/A5HW-969N ] (“[A] poll of 1805 
adults aged 16 and over discovered that 55% of them used the same password for most – if not all! – 
websites.”). 
 30 Id.; see also Amazon.com’s Third-Party Sellers Hit by Hackers, FOX BUS. (Apr. 10, 2017), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2017/04/10/amazon-coms-third-party-sellers-hit-by-hackers.html 
[https://perma.cc/6P6B-DZDK]. 
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Finally, hackers infiltrate and access personal information through the 
use of code and web-based databases.31 Information entered onto a website 
generally “gets stored in that company’s database.”32 Hackers create 
malicious text (damaging code) that, when entered into the company 
database, stops the database from running its normal code; instead, the 
database runs the malicious text.33 This “malicious takeover of the 
system”34 often goes unnoticed due to the high volume of activity that 
regularly occurs on databases.35 
 The issue of hacking and data breaches is pervasive. There is a high 
probability that your information has already been taken. Understanding 
hacking leads to a better understanding of the personal, legal, and policy 
implications behind data breach incidents. 
This note next addresses two foundational cases: Clapper and 
Remijas. During the discussion on Clapper and Remijas, the note then will 
turn into a discussion on how these two opinions formulate the proper 
analysis for determining standing for consumers after their information has 
been hacked in a data breach. 
II. CLAPPER V. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 
Clapper concerns the issue of standing under Article III of the 
Constitution.36 This widely discussed case is important to analyze when 
considering the effects that a data breach incident can have on consumers’ 
legal standing. 
In Clapper, the respondents consisted of “attorneys and human rights, 
labor, legal, and media organizations.”37 The nature of the respondents’ 
work required them to engage with clients located outside the United States 
via telephone and e-mail.38 Respondents brought a constitutional 
 
 31 Fox, supra note 10, at 9. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Kelly Jackson Higgins, Hacker’s Choice: Top Six Database Hacks, UBM: DARK READING (May 
8, 2008, 10:20 AM), https://www.darkreading.com/risk/hackers-choice-top-six-database-attacks/d/d-
id/1129481? [https://perma.cc/G5PT-NB5J] (discussing that the average hacker needs only 10 seconds 
to hack in and out of a database, and, when coupled with the fact that a typical database has tens of 
thousands of connections per second, there can be virtually no way to know what these connections are 
really doing). 
 36 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (“To establish Article III standing, an 
injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged 
action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.’”) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 
U.S. 139, 140 (2010)). 
 37 Clapper, 568 U.S. 398, 406. 
 38 Id. 
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challenge39 against § 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978 (“FISA”).40 They sought a declaration that § 1881a (where § 702 of 
FISA is codified) is unconstitutional, as well as an injunction against 
§ 1881a-authorized surveillance.41 
Respondents made several claims: (1) the government has targeted 
respondents’ clients under FISA;42 (2) the government believes 
respondents’ clients are associated with terrorist organizations;43 (3) for 
counterterrorism and diplomatic reasons, the government has focused on 
the locations where respondents’ clients live; (4) the government believes 
that the respondents’ clients oppose U.S.-backed governments;44 and (5) 
that because of FISA, respondents are forced to take costly measures to 
avoid surveillance and to protect the confidentiality of their 
communications.45 
Looking at the procedural posture, the government first prevailed at 
the district court.46 However, the Second Circuit reversed and found for 
plaintiff-respondents,47 but then denied a rehearing en banc.48 The 
 
 39 Id. at 401. 
 40 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). FISA “allows the Attorney General and the Director of National 
Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence information by jointly authorizing the surveillance of 
individuals who are not ‘United States persons’ and are reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401 (quoting § 1881a). This section of FISA has generated an 
enormous amount of controversy, especially regarding warrantless searches of U.S. citizens. Under 
FISA, the government can collect communications of Americans who communicate with other 
Americans who communicate with targeted individuals. In other words, if A is the target, and A talks to 
B, and B talks to C, the government can collect C’s communications because C talked to B who talked 
to A. Decoding 702: What is Section 702?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/702-
spying [https://perma.cc/TE8S-25JB]. As Senator Rand Paul stated, “Millions of Americans are 
accidentally or incidentally collected in this database, and we don’t want people just willy-nilly looking 
into this database without a warrant.” Kaitlyn Schallhorn, FISA Surveillance Program: What is It and 
Why is It So Controversial?, FOX NEWS (Jan. 19, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/
01/19/fisa-surveillance-program-what-is-it-and-why-is-it-so-controversial.html [https://perma.cc/S85R-
5GXH]. For an interesting discussion on the uncharted waters of computer searches, see Orin S. Kerr, 
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 540 (2005) (discussing that “[t]he 
differences between homes and computers prompt an important question: what does it mean to ‘search’ 
a computer storage device?”); see also In re Search of Info. Associated With [Redacted]@mac.Com 
That Is Stored At Premises Controlled By Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 145, 147 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(discussing a government attempt to search and seize an entire email account); United States v. 
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 282 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing a warrantless search and seizure of thousands 
of emails with regards to the Stored Communications Act). 
 41 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401. 
 42 Id. at 406.  
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See id. at 405–406. 
 46 Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated 638 F.3d 
118 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
 47 Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
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government appealed, and the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.49 In an opinion by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court reversed the 
Second Circuit, finding in favor of the government in a 5-4 decision.50 
First, “[t]o establish Article III standing,” respondents needed to 
establish that they suffered an injury that was “concrete, particularized, and 
actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and 
redressable by a favorable ruling.”51 Justice Alito emphasized that the 
Supreme Court has “repeatedly reiterated that the ‘threatened injury must 
be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that [mere] 
‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient” to establish 
standing.52 Justice Alito then addressed each of respondents’ claims. 
First, respondents failed to demonstrate the “imminent” requirement 
under Article III to establish standing.53 Justice Alito noted that it is sheer 
speculation as to “whether the Government will imminently target 
communications to which respondents are parties.”54 Rather, “respondents’ 
theory necessarily rests on their assertion that the Government will target 
other individuals—namely, their foreign contacts.”55 Additionally, 
respondents also failed to produce evidence demonstrating that their 
communications had, in fact, already been monitored.56 In sum, Justice 
Alito dismissed all of respondents’ claims that the government has or will 
target their communications as sheer conjecture. 
Next, even if respondents could prove that government surveillance 
was imminent, they failed to show that “their injury is fairly traceable to 
§ 1881a.”57 Simply put, the government has many means to conduct 
surveillance. Here, respondents’ assertion that the government would do so 
under § 1881a, instead of a different authority, was deemed sheer 
 
 48 Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 49 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 566 U.S. 1009 (2012). 
 50 See Clapper, 133 568 U.S. 398, 422. 
 51 Id. at 409. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)). 
 52 Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). The issue and holding in 
Clapper—whether respondents could establish Article III—are widely used by lower courts in data 
breach cases. Thus, the issue arises whether, when consumers’ personal information (e.g. social security 
number, name, financial information, etc.) is stolen in a data breach, is that injury “concrete, 
particularized, and actual or imminent”? See Clapper, 568 U.S. 398 at 409. Is it “certainly impending to 
constitute injury in fact”? See id. Or are consumers merely alleging “possible future injury”? See id. 
 53 Clapper, 568 U.S. 398 at 411. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 412. 
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speculation. Thus, the Court held that respondents could not satisfy the 
fairly traceable requirement.58 
Justice Alito next noted that even if respondents could prove the 
imminent and fairly traceable requirements, they “can only speculate as to 
whether [the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISC)] 
will authorize such surveillance.”59 Justice Alito stated, “In the past, we 
have been reluctant to endorse standing theories that require guesswork as 
to how independent decisionmakers will exercise their judgment.”60 Thus, 
respondents offered nothing but speculation as to how FISC will decide a 
government plan to surveil under § 1881a. 
Fourth, Justice Alito explained that, even with FISC’s approval, it is 
not clear that the government would actually be successful in their 
surveillance of respondents’ clients.61 Fifth, Justice Alito noted that “even if 
the Government were to conduct surveillance of respondents’ foreign 
contacts, respondents can only speculate as to whether their own 
communications with their foreign contacts would be incidentally 
acquired.”62 In sum, respondents failed to offer anything other than 
speculation and conjecture in their attempt to establish standing.63 
Respondents’ alternative argument was that in attempting to avoid 
government surveillance under § 1881a, they suffered injury sufficient to 
establish standing.64 Both arguments were summarily dismissed.65 The 
Court held that respondents lacked Article III standing and reversed the 
Second Circuit.66 
 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 412-414. Thus, even if the government was targeting respondents under § 1881a, the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISC) must first approve any government action to 
surveillance—respondents offered nothing but speculation on how FISC would rule. This is also 
important to keep in mind when lower courts use the holding in Clapper for determining standing after 
a data breach. Namely, there is no court acting as a gatekeeper determining which hackers have access 
to personal and financial information. In contrast, the government here bears the burden of proving their 
case to a court in the hope of being granted permission to attempt to surveil the desired target. 
 60 Id. at 413. 
 61 Id at 414. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. As Justice Alito states, “In sum, respondents’ speculative chain of possibilities does not 
establish that injury based on potential future surveillance is certainly impending or is fairly traceable to 
§ 1881a.” Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Consider the following factual analogy to be drawn here compared with a data breach. Namely, 
that in Clapper respondents took measures to avoid future injury (but failed to establish standing 
because the injury was speculative). Whereas after a consumer’s information is stolen in a data breach, 
they may seek costly credit monitoring and other preventative measures to protect against identity theft 
and fraud. The question of whether this establishes standing is next addressed in Remijas below. 
 66 Clapper, 568 U.S. 398 at 422. 
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The dissent, written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan, focused on whether the injury (the 
interception of communication) was actual or imminent.67 Justice Breyer 
did not view respondents’ harm as speculative.68 
III. REMIJAS AND CLAPPER IN THE DATA BREACH CONTEXT 
The Seventh Circuit in Remijas69 established a clear standard for 
determining standing in data breach lawsuits by distinguishing Clapper. 
After Clapper, many lower courts read its holding broadly and denied 
standing for those who had been affected in data breaches.70 Remijas 
recognized the clear factual differences between issues of national security 
and that of commercial data breaches.71 
In Remijas, approximately 350,000 credit cards had been exposed to 
malware on Neiman Marcus’ system.72 The cyberattack produced nearly 
9,200 cards that were fraudulently used.73 Plaintiffs, a group of affected 
customers, brought a class-action lawsuit.74 Plaintiffs brought a variety of 
claims, including violation of multiple state data breach laws, totaling over 
$5,000,000 in damages.75 
Neiman Marcus moved to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to 
state a claim.76 The motion was granted by the district court based 
exclusively on standing.77 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and found standing for 
plaintiffs.78 The court examined whether plaintiffs satisfied “Clapper’s 
 
 67 Id. at 424 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 68 Id at 422. This note need not thoroughly address the dissent because, while persuasive and well-
researched, it is not relevant to the topic of this note. 
 69 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 70 See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2017); Peters v. St. Joseph Servs. 
Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 856 (S.D. Tex. 2015); Green v. eBay Inc., No.14 1688, 2015 WL 2066531, 
at *4 (E.D. La. May 4, 2015); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 
45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 24 (D.D.C. 2014); In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 WL 
4759588, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013), vacated sub nom. Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 
F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 71 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693-94. 
 72 Id. at 690. 
 73 Id.; see also Evan Schuman, Neiman Marcus Data Breach Settlement Tells Us Plenty About the 
ROI of Security: When Breaches Cost So Little, There’s Not Much Incentive to Avoid Them, 
COMPUTERWORLD: IDG COMMUNICATIONS (Apr. 3, 2017), [https://perma.cc/9W23-CJHB] (discussing 
the cost benefit analysis of notifying customers of the breach of their personal information). 
 74 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690. 
 75 Id. at 690–91. 
 76 Id. at 691. Neiman Marcus cited Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 697. 
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requirement that [the] injury either already have occurred or be ‘certainly 
impending.’”79 
The court stated that plaintiffs “should not have to wait until hackers 
commit identity theft or credit-card fraud in order to [have] standing, 
because there is an ‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ that such an injury 
will occur.”80 Indeed, the court plainly stated that, “it is plausible to infer 
that the plaintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm. . . . Why else 
would hackers break into a store’s data base and steal consumers’ private 
information?”81 The court next clarified their position in light of the holding 
in Clapper, noting that Clapper does not prevent establishing standing 
based on future injuries.82 
Finally, the court examined plaintiffs’ allegation that they had lost 
time and money in taking protective measures against future harm (fraud 
and identity theft).83 Judge Wood again distinguished Clapper and stated, 
“[o]nce again, however, it is important not to overread Clapper. Clapper 
was addressing speculative harm based on something that may not even 
have happened to some or all of the plaintiffs.”84 In distinction, Judge 
Wood noted that unlike the speculation in Clapper, the facts in Remijas 
clearly satisfy the issue of standing.85 Simply put, Judge Wood stated, 
“[t]hat easily qualifies as a concrete injury.”86 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This note will next address how these two opinions formulate the 
proper analysis for determining standing after a data breach incident. 
 
 79 Id. at 692. 
 80 Id. at 693. 
 81 Id. (emphasis added). 
 82 Id. Specifically, Judge Wood found key language in Clapper: 
[Clapper] stated that “[o]ur cases do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is literally 
certain that the harms they identify will come about . . . . [W]e have found standing based on a 
‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to 
mitigate or avoid that harm.” 
Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013)). 
 83 Id. at 694. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. Judge Wood noted that it was not even contested by Neiman Marcus that a breach had 
occurred; that affected and notified customer might reasonably believe it necessary to receive monthly 
credit monitoring; that Neiman Marcus was in fact offering free credit monitoring for a year; and that 
credit-monitoring is not cheap. These helped in her determination that standing was proper. Id. For an 
interesting discussion on injury and harm see Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and 
Anxiety: A Theory of Data -Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737 (2018). 
 86 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 694. 
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Finally, this note will discuss the benefit that state data breach notification 
laws provide, as opposed to a uniform federal notification law. 
Courts have read Clapper in the overly broad light that Remijas 
counseled against with regards to data breach incidents and consumer 
standing in litigation.87 Additionally, law review articles are critical of 
Clapper because of the uncertainty surrounding its holding—i.e., whether it 
“tightens” the requirements to establish standing after a data breach or 
whether it is merely a very narrowly written opinion.88 
The criticism of Clapper and its ostensible “tightening” is misguided. 
Clapper does not create a tightening89 on what is necessary for standing in 
 
 87 See In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 
28 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that “since Clapper was handed down last year, courts have been even more 
emphatic in rejecting ‘increased risk’ as a theory of standing in data-breach cases.”); In re Barnes & 
Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013) (noting that 
“[m]erely alleging an increased risk of identity theft or fraud is insufficient to establish standing. But 
see Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388–89 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that 
“Plaintiffs’ allegations of a substantial risk of harm, coupled with reasonably incurred mitigation costs, 
are sufficient to establish a cognizable Article III injury at the pleading stage of the litigation” and that 
“[t]his conclusion is in line with two recent decisions from the Seventh Circuit addressing standing in 
data-breach cases[,]” namely, Remijas and Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963 (7th 
Cir. 2016)); In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (noting 
that “Clapper’s discussion of standing arose in the sensitive context of a claim that other branches of 
government were violating the Constitution, and the U.S. Supreme Court itself noted that its standing 
analysis was unusually rigorous as a result.”). 
 88 See, e.g., Standing - Challenges to Government Surveillance - Clapper v. Amnesty International 
USA, 127 HARV. L. REV. 298, 303 (2013) (“The Clapper majority does not make clear whether the 
‘certainly impending’ standard applies to all future litigants of any kind, or only to those challenging 
governmental action in intelligence or foreign affairs.”); John Biglow, It Stands to Reason: An 
Argument for Article III Standing Based on the Threat of Future Harm in Data Breach Litigation, 17 
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 943, 955 (2016) (“In the wake of Clapper, it seemed unclear whether data 
breach cases in which plaintiffs lack actual misuse of data would be able to survive a Clapper challenge 
to standing.”); Thomas Martecchini, A Day in Court for Data Breach Plaintiffs: Preserving Standing 
Based on Increased Risk of Identity Theft After Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. 1471, 1478–79 (2016) (“The Supreme Court’s subsequent consideration of increased risk standing 
in a separate context—in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA—only compounded the uncertainty 
created by the circuit split.”); Claire Wilka, The Effects of Clapper v. Amnesty International USA: An 
Improper Tightening of the Requirement for Article III Standing in Medical Data Breach Litigation, 49 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 467, 471–75 (2016) (showing disparity among lower courts’ interpretation of 
Clapper); see also James C. Chou, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and Standing Law: A Framework for 
Data Breaches Using Substantial Risk in a Post-Clapper World, 7 AM. U. NAT’L SEC. L. BRIEF 120, 
181 (2017) (presenting a framework for standing in light of Clapper). 
 89 In Moyer, the defendants argued that the United States Supreme Court in Clapper tightened the 
requirements for standing for injuries based on a future risk of harm. Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 
No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL 3511500, at*4 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014). The Moyer court disagreed. Id. at *5. 
There the court noted that the injury-in-fact requirement was applied so rigorously in Clapper because 
Clapper was addressing a much different issue: the constitutionality of a congressional law in light of a 
national security issue. Id. at *5-6. The issue in Clapper is not connected nor similar to a data security 
breach that involves the identity theft and the future possibility of harm. Also, Clapper was attenuated; 
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data breach lawsuits. The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Remijas90 clearly 
demonstrates that Clapper is factually distinct from data breach lawsuits.91 
Indeed, Clapper is very narrowly written and should be read accordingly.92 
Thus, Clapper must be read in light of the context in which it was written: 
national security. To simply cut and paste its Article III standing analysis 
based on speculative and future injury into any category that roughly fits is 
error. As such, Clapper and Remijas, read in tandem, are in harmony and 
provide a clear and workable standard for determining standing for post-
data breach incidents. 
This note now makes its final turn towards data breach notification 
laws. Looking back at how these events unfold, they first start with a 
hacking. Then there is a data breach. Once a data breach has occurred, 
companies face difficult decisions over what to do next. Do they notify the 
affected individuals? Are they are required to or not? And, if they do 
notify, in what way should they provide the notice? These decisions are 
made even more difficult because state laws governing notification 
requirements are each somewhat unique.93 
First, while the effects of a company hacking are far-reaching and 
often span across numerous states and even countries, a micro-oriented, 
local response is the more efficient way to deal with data breaches and is 
therefore properly in the realm of the states.94 Indeed, hacking and data 
breaches are ubiquitous.95 With thousands of breaches occurring every day, 
with technology progressing far faster than any safeguard can be set in 
 
whereas most data breaches are not. It is important to understand what makes these situations 
distinguishable. 
 90 794 F.3d at 697. 
 91 Id. at 693–94. 
 92 Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review of Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think, 108 MICH. L. REV. 859, 
863 (2010) (explaining that “‘narrow opinions’ are more apt to produce unanimity; unanimity limits 
rather than aggravates the risk of ‘political’ judging by accommodating more rather than fewer 
perspectives; unanimity enhances the Court’s credibility when it makes difficult decisions about issues 
that Americans care deeply about; and while narrow decision making assuredly buys time, that time 
may be well spent in allowing more compelling answers to a difficult problem to emerge”). 
 93 THOMAS, supra note 6. (“In the United States, most states and the District of Columbia have 
enacted data breach notification laws that require companies that own or license personal information to 
notify affected individuals in the event the company discovers or becomes aware of a breach of security 
involving certain types of information.”). 
 94 See Sara A. Needles, The Data Game: Learning to Love the State-Based Approach to Data 
Breach Notification Law, 88 N.C. L. REV. 267, 288 (2009) (arguing for a state-based approach instead 
of a federal approach because state laws are tailored to protect specific interests and state laws are 
already supplemented by Federal, industry-specific laws). 
 95 Jose Pagliery, The Cybercrime Economy: Half of American Adults Hacked this Year, CNN 
TECH (May 28, 2014, 9:25 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/28/technology/security/hack-data-
breach/index.html [https://perma.cc/39XY-ZT6S]. In 2014 alone, 432 million accounts were hacked as 
well as 110 million Americans. Id. 
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place, and with seemingly every entity being vulnerable,96 the federal 
government is simply too big of an entity to handle such a hurricane of 
issues.97 In a situation such as this, it is far better to have fifty different 
states, each with its own tailored procedure and separate funding, be 
responsible for combating data breaches and determining best practices for 
informing the public.98 
Second, each state and its attorney general is highly incentivized to 
see that its citizens are not falling victim to hackings.99 Simply put, state 
notification laws can be amended and specifically crafted to benefit the 
 
 96 Andy Greenberg, The NSA Official Has A Rogue Contractor Problem, WIRED (Oct. 5, 2017, 
5:43 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/nsa-contractors-hacking-tools/ [https://perma.cc/J6AV-8AGT]. 
Even the NSA was hacked. Id. How much confidence should consumers really have with the average 
store (e.g. Target, Walmart, etc.)? 
 97 See Needles, supra note 94, at 308 (“A federal law that aims to address the complex, 
multivariable definition of personally identifiable information, let alone the manner in which companies 
must respond to breaches, would not be nimble enough to remain relevant in a rapidly changing 
industry.”). 
 98 See Cybersecurity and Data Privacy Outlook and Review: 2016, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/cybersecurity-and-data-privacy-outlook-and-review-2016/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q8UQ-Z8ZQ] (explaining the criticism of the proposed Data Security and Breach 
Notification Act by privacy activists on the position that the bill would preempt state laws that are more 
effective in protecting consumer privacy and because the notification requirements would be “triggered 
only if the company decides there is a risk of financial harm, which, in [the] critics’ view, gives 
companies too much discretion and would lead to incidents being underreported.”). 
 99 Id. (“2015 saw many states updating their data breach notification laws . . . .”). Indeed, even the 
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) supports state autonomy over federal control. They 
have recently sent a letter to Congress urging Congress to keep states in control of data breach 
legislation enforcement. See also Federal Data Breach Legislation Should Not Preempt States, NAAG, 
http://www.naag.org/naag/media/naag-news/federal-data-breach-legislation-should-not-preempt-
states1.php [https://perma.cc/URS2-T2D3]. The NAAG’s primary concern is that a majority of current 
federal bills that pertain to data breach notification and security preempt the states. Id. The letter, signed 
by 47 state and territorial attorney generals, explain that preempting state law—and thereby giving 
federal government more power—would in fact make consumers less protected. Id. Unlike the federal 
government, the “States are on the front lines in helping consumers deal with the repercussions of a data 
breach” and are therefore can take a more tailored approach. Id. This approach stems from the fact that 
“attorneys general regularly investigate the causes of data breaches to determine whether data 
collectors . . . used reasonable data security practices and notified consumers . . . according to the 
requirements of state law.” Id. In addition to these reasons, the States have already “adopt[ed] data 
breach notification laws [since] 2003, and some have since required data collectors experiencing 
breaches to directly notify the attorney general in order to respond more quickly to concerned 
consumers[,]” which in turns provides for a more expedited and targeted response. Id. Finally, the letter 
from NAAG makes several important final notes: (1) that it is imperative that the States continue to 
“enforce breach notification requirements under their own state laws;” (2) with any federal law being 
passed, the states should still be allotted sufficient “flexibility to adapt their . . . laws to respond to 
changes in technology and data collection[;]” and (3) the power to place “requirements on data 
collectors that go beyond those required at the federal level[,]” should stay within the states. Id. In sum, 
there is a strong consensus that federal law operates best when innovative state law and enforcement 
supplement it. Id. 
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consumer by forcing companies to provide better means of relief and 
stronger safeguards against such hacks.100 
Third, while every state has its own financial issues, on average, state-
wide data breach notification laws and procedures backed by state funding 
would fare better (again, think micro not macro).101 The federal government 
simply does not have enough funding to cover the series of hacking 
incidents that are springing up every day, each its own isolated and unique, 
festering problem.102 The states, however, have less projects that need 
financial support than the federal government; and therefore, the states are 
in a better position to provide relief after a damaging hack.103 
Finally, states are better suited to enact laws that take preventative 
measures to counter data breaches. Preventative measures are critical for 
safeguarding consumers from data breaches. Often, companies that have 
been targeted by hackers and that have suffered data breaches are able to 
avoid paying damages because they never promised to safeguard the 
consumers’ information.104 However, this is wrong and unfair. State laws 
should require companies to take affirmative steps to ensure that their 
consumers’ information is protected. 
Implementing an affirmative step requirement on companies and 
businesses to protect consumer information would not only act as a 
 
 100 See Needles, supra note 94, at 302 (“Businesses have a market-based incentive to create and 
abide by strong breach notification policies.”). 
 101 See John S. Kiernan, 2017’s Most & Least Federally Dependent States, WALLETHUB (Mar. 19, 
2019), https://wallethub.com/edu/states-most-least-dependent-on-the-federal-government/2700/ [https://
perma.cc/V7EU-TCZN]. 
 102 See USA Debt Clock – How Much Is The US National Debt?, COMMODITY, 
https://www.nationaldebtclocks.org/debtclock/unitedstates [https://perma.cc/E8JP-2WAV]. But see 
Annie Lowrey, Are States Really More Efficient Than the Federal Government?¸ ATLANTIC (Oct. 2, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/graham-cassidy-states-federal-efficiency/
541599/ [https://perma.cc/6BUN-FL48] (noting that “turning programs over to the states tends to result 
in the 50 capitals pursuing varying policy priorities and achieving disparate policy outcomes—not in a 
sleeker, more efficient government”). However, given the strong public policy interest in protecting 
consumers from harm, any likely disparities in how the states approach their data breach notification 
responses would only vary in severity of punishment—not necessarily in effectiveness of curing harm. 
 103 However, none of this is to say that the federal government is to sit on its hands; the opposite, 
rather, is needed in that the federal government should provide more funding against cyber-related 
attacks, should create more hacking-specific task forces, and should make it clear that cyber-attacks are 
the biggest threat to national security that this country has ever seen. 
 104 Evan M. Wooten, The State of Data-Breach Litigation and Enforcement: Before the 2013 Mega 
Breaches and Beyond, 24 COMPETITION: J. ANTI. & UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 229, 231 (2015) 
(“Historically, courts have refused to construe generic statements on company websites or promotional 
materials—that consumer data was safe or protected by certain security measures, such as firewalls or 
encryption—as express contractual obligations, or to imply contracts from such statements or the 
customer relationship at large.”); See e.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00325-RCJ-VPC, 2013 
WL 4830497, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 9, 2013) (“Plaintiffs allege that [defendant] breached a contract to 
safeguard their data. But there is no allegation of any express or implied contract.”). 
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deterrence for hackers, it would incentivize businesses to create stronger 
cyber-walls and develop a better relationship with consumers and 
government agencies.105 On a state level, the local governments would be in 
a much better position to determine the proper affirmative step 
requirements and would also be better suited for understanding what would 
incentivize local businesses.106 
CONCLUSION 
This note provided an overview of a serious and uncharted area of the 
law and the everyday lives of Americans. It briefly discussed hacking and 
the various methods used by hackers. It then discussed two key cases, 
Clapper and Remijas, and their respective facts and holdings. Finally, this 
note proceeded to analyze the holdings of these cases and the discussion 
between state and federal data breach laws. One thing is certain in the area 
of the law where people’s data is mined and sold like gold, where privacy 
 
 105 While it could be argued that this would not be economically feasible for many business, 
especially smaller businesses, this type of implementation would have to operate on a case-by-case 
basis. As such, this is why state-wide data breach notification laws are better suited for this. 
Additionally, these requirements should come with both a reward for meeting the requirements and a 
punishment for failing to do so. Meaning, if a business or company meets the affirmative steps to ensure 
consumer information safety, in the event of a data breach, they should be given some lenity—or even a 
safeguard against certain types of damage. On the other hand, if these steps are not taken, the business 
should suffer stringent consequences such as paying extra fines, paying for certain number of years of 
credit monitoring, and perhaps even being held per se liable for certain damages depending on the 
severity of the breach. See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and 
Privacy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-
approach-data-protection [https://perma.cc/5C27-8J7Z] (arguing that “incentives for companies to 
protect data should skew toward prevention, rather than self-flagellating disclosures. Disclosure after 
the fact only helps the legal and compliance industries that have cropped up in the wake of recent 
breaches”). While I agree with O’Connor on this point, I cannot agree with a majority of her article—
especially the arguments for a single comprehensive federal law as opposed to the “patchwork” of state 
laws. It is easy to peg the various state laws as a “patchwork” since they are not in uniformity. But to do 
so, and to argue that because they lack a uniformity that they are therefore inferior to a single, uniform 
federal law, is, at the very root, taking this debate back to the 1790’s between Alexander Hamilton and 
Thomas Jefferson. The Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, advocated for a strong central 
government; whereas Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans, or Democratic-Republicans vied for 
strong states’ rights. See American History From Revolution to Reconstruction and Beyond: Hamilton 
vs. Jefferson, UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN, http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/outlines/history-2005/the-
formation-of-a-national-government/hamilton-vs-jefferson.php [https://perma.cc/KBZ2-NPSN]. With 
history in mind, the debate has not changed in substance, but, perhaps only in form. 
 106 Again, while this argument may begin to look like the classic Federalist versus Republican 
debate, this situation necessitates a fine-tuned and tailored approach that only the states can bring on an 
individual basis. 
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is seemingly a forgotten principle,107 and where nothing can be hidden from 



































 107 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 220 
(1890) (“Shall the courts thus close the front entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the back 
door to idle or prurient curiosity?”). 
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